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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRTEENTH AND WASHING-
TON STREETS CORPORATION, 
a California Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant) 
1 
vs. 
CL.A.RENCE c~. NESLEN, ELLIOTT 
\V-. E\-rANS, H. D. LOWRY, and 
~L-\R,TIN J. BERTOCH, 
l 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7875 
The respondents agree generally with the appellant's 
Statement of F·acts. It is believed, however, that the 
Court would be aided by a reference to some additional 
facts a.nd by a brief comment on some of the facts set · 
out by app·ellant. 
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The respondents paid rent in full for the entire 
period of their occupancy of the premises and there is 
no contention on the part of the appellant that there was 
a delinquency in this regard. The action seeks only to 
recover rent for a period subsequent to the vacating of 
the premises by the- respondents ( R. 1). 
During the period of the occupancy, complaints as 
to conditions in the building were made continuously 
and frequently (R. 38, 72). They were made not only 
by the respondents themselves (R. 38, 72) but by their 
employees (R. 58) as well as by other tenants in the 
building (R. 64, 97). It appears that the complaints were 
made to various representatives of the lessor, including 
Mr. Kipp, Mr. Smith, Mr. Dayton and Mr. Kotila (R. 
38, 58, 64, 72, 73). The complaints covered a variety 
of grievances including the failure to keep the building 
open after 8 P.M_. in the evening (R. 62, 68), inadequate 
heat during both winters (R. 39, 57, 58, 64), unsatis-
factory restroom facilities (R. 39, 57, 58, 63, 107), the 
hazards and inconvenience of using the· stair well result-
ing from lack of light (R. 33, 63, 69, 107), lack of clean-
liness (R. 107), the leaving of beauty parlor supplies 
and janitorial supplies on the staircase (R. 32, 69), and 
permitting the operation of the beauty parlor in the 
foyer of the building with the attendant obnoxious 
odors (R. 35, 70). The complaints covered conditions 
the existence of which made the premises unsuitable for 
a law o:ffice. Furthermore, the conditions complained 
of were such that the building could not be held to be a 
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.. First Class" building as lessor's agent represented it 
would be. 
The only other attorney in the building, 1fr. Her-
bert B. ~I a"", also testified to the existence of conditions 
that were not con1patible with the effective operation 
of a law office. He termed the situation "humiliating" 
and "uncomfortable" and testified that the conditions 
re1nained unchanged (R. 61-66). 
Notwithstanding the variety and frequency of the 
complaints, little was done to remedy the· situat~on (R. 
64). The lack of remedial action appears to have been 
attributable to the lessor's representatives in New York 
City rather than the local agents (R. 64, 73, 102). 
The written lease between the parties contained the 
follo"'~ng specific provision: 
''25. The building will be open from 8 A.M. 
until 12 P.M. Tenants desiring the use of office 
before or after these hours should apply at build-
ing office for p·ermission." (R. 17). 
Notwithstanding this specific p~rovision, the building 
was closed every evening at about 8 P.M. (R. 92, 105, 
68, 29, 62). 
During the period of their occupancy of the 
premises, the respondents made inquiries for suitable 
space in other offi·ce buildings. They were, however, 
unable to locate suitable space unti'l shortly before they 
1noved out of the leased premises (R. 48, 74). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The facts as found by the lower court constitute a 
constructive eviction. 
The acts and omissions of appellant which the Court 
found to have been committed or omitted are set out 
in Findings No. VI to and including No. XIII (R. 113-4). 
These- acts were cumulative and continuing. Perhaps 
no one of them, standing alone, would have been suffi-
cient to constitute a constructive eviction but all of them 
together, did in the opinion of respondents as well as 
the trial Court, constitute such eviction. 
Appellant contends that acts of omission do not 
constitute an eviction, however, the authorities set forth 
in appellant's brief do not support this contention. 
F'urthermore, there were in this case more than omis-
sions. There were, in addition, certain affirmative acts 
committed by appellant, an example being the locking 
of the building with the result that the· building was not 
open to clients of respondents after 8 P.M. and on Sun-
days and holidays. The appellant also rented space in 
the lobby of the building to the beauty parlor operator. 
As a result of the operation of this parlor, the lobby 
passageway and stairway, which were required to be 
used by respondents and their clients, were obstructed 
(Ex. 1 and 2). As a further result of the operation of 
the beauty parlor, obnoxious fumes and odors were cre-
ated which permeated respondents' office suite. 
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Appellant contends that respondents did not show 
that the appellant's actions were made with intent to 
evict. The intention of the landlord is in1material if the 
acts or omissions of the landlord interfere with the 
beneficial enjoyn1ent of the premises by the tenant. 
·~ .... -\ n1an is presumed, in law, to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of his acts; 
and, therefore, acts or on1issions of the landlord 
'vhich are calculated to, and do, make it necessary 
for the tenants to remove from demised premises 
constitute a constructive eviction." 
36 C. J. Landlord and Tenant, S·ec. 989, Page 
263. 
The following statement from an Oregon case 1n 
our opinion correctly states the law: 
''lT pon these questions an examination of the 
authorities disclose a wide diversity of judicial 
opinion but we think, except in certain cases 
'vhere the intent of the landlord is valuable in 
deter1nining the nature of the acts performed, 
the intent is iininaterial, since the vital fact to be 
determined is the interference with the tenant's 
beneficial enjoyment of the premises. And in 
the case at bar, if the action of the landlord did 
work such an interference, the intent with which 
he acted is of no imp·ortance." 
Hotel l\1arion Co. v. Waters (1915), 77 Or. 
426, 150 Pa.c. 865, at page 868. 
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The Supre1ne Court of Utah in discussing the sub-
jects of actual eviction and constructive eviction quotes 
from Black's Law Dictionary as follows: 
''Actual eviction is an actual expulsion of 
the tenant out of all or some part of the demised 
premises; a physical ouster or dispossession from 
the very thing granted or some substantial part 
thereof. e • 8 
"Constructive eviction. * $ • With reference 
to the relation of landlord and tenant there is a 
'Constructive eviction' when the former, without 
intent to oust the latter, does some act which 
deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment 
of the demised premises or n1aterially impairs 
such enjoyment* 111< @." 
Barker v. Utah Oil Refining Co. (1947), 111 
Utah 308, 178 P. (2d) 386 at page 388. 
The appellant contends that the results of the con-
ditions complained of were not grave, substantial and 
permanent. They were indeed grave and substantial 
to the respondents who, together with their employees 
and clients had to face the situation daily during the 
period of more than two years they occupied the prem-
ises. There was not, nor could there be, any beneficial 
enjoyment of the premises under the conditions which 
existed during the entire period of respondents' occu-
pancy. The conditions described by respondent Evans 
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(R·. 23 to 55), by respondent Ne~len (R. 66 to 81), by 
Ma..x 1{. Mangum, .who occupied a portion of the space 
leased, and \vho is a lawyer (R. 106 to 109), by Mrs. 
Beverly Fisher, a stenographer employed in the office 
of the respondents, at the time they occupied the prem-
ises (R. 56 to 60), and by Herbert B. Maw, a. lawyer, 
who also occupied space in the building, cannot under 
any circumstances be correctly classified as not grave 
and substantial. ~Ir. ~Iaw outlined the procedure that 
had to be followed in meeting clients at his office during 
evening hours or on Sundays or holidays. He described 
the situation and summed it up by saying: 
"Yes, it was a humiliating process." (R. 62, 
line 30). 
The law is a dignified and learned profession and 
the offices of lawyers are usually located in "First Class" 
office buildings with clean accommodations and surround-
ings \vhich meet the approval of the p,ublic. Certainly 
the conditions which appellant created, or p·ermitted 
to exist in the building were grave and substantial and 
interfered with the use and enjoyment of the premises 
by the respondents for the use which said premises were 
intended, which, as the lease specifically provided, was 
for an attorneys' office (R. 8). 
Appellant contends that it cannot be held respon-
sible for the fumes and odors arising from the beauty 
parlor which it permitted to occupy a portion of the 
foyer or lobby and for the obstructions which the opera-
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tion of said beauty parlor caused in the lobby and stair-
way, which respondents, their employees and clients 
were required to use on occasions. It would not appear 
reasonable to perrnit the landlord to escape from the 
consequences of leasing space to a beauty parlor without 
making adequate provision for the elimination of ob-
noxious odors and fumes, yet practically the on'ly source 
of ventilation was the stairway going to the upper floors 
( R. 100). Under the circumstances, the obnoxious odors 
and fumes inevitably filled not only the lobby of the office 
building through which respondents' clients had to pass 
but also permeated to the portion of the building occu-
pied by respondents. The evidence is without dispute 
that the equipment used in the beauty parlor, of neces-
sity obstructed the hall and passage way and was in 
plain view of persons waiting for elevators to go to the 
upper floors of the building (Ex. 2). The appellant 
must also be deemed to be chargeable with pe-rmitting 
this condition to exist. 
Numerous cases have decided that under particular 
facts landlords become responsible for actions of other 
tenants and nuisances created by other tenants and that 
such actions constitute constructive eviction. In an early 
Colorado case it was held that a tenant was justified 
in abandoning his rooms and treating himself as evicted, 
where his landlord rented adjacent rooms to lewd women, 
knowing the purpose for which the rooms were to be 
used, and thereafter, on complaint as to their noisy and 
offensive conduct, took no steps to remove them. 
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Lay v. Bennett (1864), 4 Colorado Appeals 
252, 35 Pac. 7 48. 
Certainly, where the landlord, as in this case, rents 
a portion of the building, to a business, the operation 
of which naturally causes obnoxious fuines and odors, 
without n1aking any provision for ventilation of the 
space so as to prevent the fumes and odors from going 
into the remainder of the building to the annoyance of 
other tenants, the landlord cannot escape the natural 
results from the operation of business by that tenant. 
The landlord attempts to escape from the adinitted 
annoyance and discomfort caused by the operation of 
this beauty parlor by attempting to pass the blame for 
its location to Mr. Neslen, one of the respondents. Ap-
pellant's brief refers to a letter written by respondent 
Neslen on behalf of the operators of the beauty parlor. 
This letter was written by Mr. N eslen in his capacity 
as attorney representing clients. The reference in the 
letter to the desirability of moving the! beauty parlor 
from the department store to the lobby of the office· 
building was made at the instance of the clients and rep-
resented their proposal and desire in the prernises (R. 
75, 76). The suggestion, however, has no relevancy to 
the question here involved, which is as to whether or 
not the beauty parlor and its operation constituted an 
obstruction and interference with the. respondents' en-
joyment of the demised premises. Specifically, the ques-
tion is as to whether or not the use of the hallways, 
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stairways and passageways by the· beauty parlor for 
the storage of their supplies and equipment and the 
creation of obnoxious odors created conditions that 
weTe detrin1ental to the enjoyment of the premises by 
respondents for the purpose for which they leased the 
prerruses. 
Appellant cont~nds that the conditions must be not 
only grave and substantial in order to constitute a con-
structive eviction 'but that they must also be permanent. 
The bad conditions were in fact permanent in one sense, 
in that they existed for more than two years during which 
period the· respondents occupied the premises. An ex-
amination of the authorities cited by appellant shows 
that they do not support the theory that the acts of the· 
landlord must be permanent in the sense that the situa-
tion created cannot be remedied by the landlord. 
In a New York case it was held that there was a 
constructive eviction where the landlord notified tenant 
that use of passenger elevator in an apartment building 
by tenant's governess would no longer be pe·rmitted. 
The landlord was not authorized to refuse to allow gov-
erness to use the elevator, and the tenant accepted the 
noti~e as an ultimatum. 
Park Ave. M. E. Church vs. Barrett, 30 
N.Y.S. 2nd 667. 
It is contended by the appellant that respondents 
did not move from the premises within a reasonable 
10 
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time because of the conditions and that they therefore 
waived their right to n1ove. This contention see1ns very 
inconsistent with the strenuous argument to the effect 
that respondents at no time had the right to 1nove. The 
facts supported by the record and found by the lower 
court are that respondents moved as soon as they found 
suitable quarters (R. 38, 73 and 114). Up to the time 
that respondents moved the conditions con1plained of 
had not been remedied. 
The following citations support the position of the 
respondents in staying in the premises until they were 
able to find suitable space to meet their needs: 
Where the lessee continued in possession over a 
year it was held that lessee did not waive dust and 
smoke nuisance from lessor's ·heating p1ant, where plant 
was not operated much of the time and lessee continually 
complained thereof the rest of the time. 
Frosh v. Sun Drug Co., 1932, 91 Colorado 440, 
16 P. (2d) 428. 
In the above case the Court stated on page 430 of 
16 P. (2d): 
"It is said that the company continued in 
possession and paid rent for more than a year, 
and thereby waived the injury. During much of 
this time, however, the heating plant was not in 
11 
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operation, and there is ample evidence that dur-
ing the· reJnainder the company was continually 
complaining and demanding relief, and that Frosh 
was continually promising action. Under such 
circumstances, there is no waiver." (Several 
cases are there cited). 
In another Colorado case, J. C. Penney Co. vs. Bir-
rell ( 1934) tried upon the theory of constructive eviction, 
the question was raised as to whether the defendant 
had waived any right to claim an eviction by his failure 
to abandon within a reasonable time. The defendant, 
who successfully contended that he had been evicted 
by acts of the plaintiff, delayed moving from ~he prem-
ises from March, 1930, to July 28, 1931. He looked for 
other quarters, but found none available in the business 
section and then decided to put up his own building and 
kept possession of the leased premises until his building 
could be erected. He was delayed by financing, building 
and weather conditions. The Court stated: 
"The case was tried upon the theory of 
constructive eviction. Plaintiff seeks a reversal 
by contending there was no eviction, and further 
that if it could be so considered, that defendant 
waived any right to claim an eviction by his 
failure to abandon within a reasonable· time. 
What is a reasonable time, depends solely upon 
the facts peculiar to the case. The facts sur-
rounding the latter claim were fully heard and 
considered by the Court, and being determined 
in defendant's favor upon sufficient evidence, will 
not be disturbed." 
12 
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J. C. Penney Co. v. Birrell ( 1934), 95 Colo-
rado 59, 32 Pac. (2d) 805 at p·age 806. 
In a Massachusetts case, Ron1e v. ,Johnson ( 1931), 
174 N.E. 716, the difficulty of finding another location 
suitable for tenants' business was alluded to as a cir-
cumstance to be considered by the jury in deternlining 
whether the tenant had acted with reasonable prornpti-
tude. 
Although there is no direct evidence to that effect, 
it is believed the Court could reasonably take judicial 
notice of the fact that during the period in question, 
office space, suitable for several practicing lawyers, was 
extremely critical. The trial judge undoubtedly con-
sidered this as one of the circumstances which justified 
respondents in remo:ving from the premises when they 
did. 
POINT II. 
The findings of fact of the lower court are justified by 
the evidence. 
Appellant contends that it was error for the lower 
Court to include in Findings of F·act XI, XII, and XIII 
that the acts and omissions of appellant were "greatly 
to the detriment of Defendants' professional practice." 
Appellant recites the evidence on the subject and con-
cludes that since the respondents did not and could not 
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testify as to the loss of any clients or examples of the 
loss of n1oney as the result of the conditions, that these 
Findings are erroneous. 
It is the contention of the respondents that the 
Court n1ight make such conclusions from the facts estab-
lished as may be reasonable and that the complained of 
clauses in the Findings were reasonably concluded from 
the facts proven. 
The Utah Supreme Court in discussing the subject 
said: 
"The errors urged are ~ * * (2) that they 
are 'not findings of fact but conclusions from 
facts shown.' * :iF * The second complaint is no 
objection at all. Findings should be limited to 
the ultimate facts to be ascertained, and such 
findings are none the less. findings of fact because 
drawn as conclusions from other facts." 
Fuller v. Burnett (1926), 66 U. 507, 243 P. 
790. 
If the inclusion of the clause, which appellant con-
tends there is no evidence to support, in the three Find-
ings of Fact was error on the part of the lower Court 
said error is harmless error because the judgment can 
be supported by the other findings. 
It is finally contended by appellant that there is no 
evidence presented to substantiate Finding XVII, "That 
14 
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the defendants moved fron1 and vacated said pre1nises 
by reason of the acts and o1nissions of the plaintiff as 
soon as they could find suitable quarters for their use 
as attorneys' offices." 
There \Vas no evidence offered to contradict the 
testimony of Mr. Neslen and Mr. Evans on this subject. 
Under these circrm1sta.nces it is submitted that there 
was evidence to support the Finding. 
In support of respondents' contention that the prem-
ises were vacated within a reasonable time, the follow-
ing facts and circumstances are reiterated: 
(a) The premises were occupied and rent paid 
therefor for more than two years; 
(b) During this entire time, complaints were 
made frequently and continuously to the land-
lord setting forth intolerable conditions; 
(c) During this entire time promises were made 
on the part of the landlord that the conditions 
\vould be remedied; 
(d) The. conditions were 1n fact not remedied 
during respondents' occupancy; 
(e) The respondents vacated the premises when 
suitable sp-ace became available in another 
·building. 
15 
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These a.re the facts as supported by the evidence and 
they support the Findings Inade by the· trial Court that 
the premises were vacated within a r~asonable time. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The facts found by the Lower Court constitute a 
constructive eviction justifying the respondents vacating 
the· leased premises and the Findings of F·act of the 
Lower Court are justified by the· evidence and there are 
sufficient Findings of Fact to support the Conclusions 
of Law and the Judgment of the Lower Court. 
ed. 
The Judgment of the Lower Court should be affirm-
Respectfully submitted, 
LEONARD W. ELTON, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respo'Y!'dents. 
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